History and facts of the territorial redistribution of the revolution and civil war.
Today it is obvious that all the successive, though outwardly malosvyazannye software installation western policy towards the processes in the Soviet Union served as erosion barriers to entry in NATO's historic parts of Russia. The most important of them was the recognition of the Baltic states are not as separated parts of the Soviet Union, as well as the restoration of the pre-war state. The adoption of the Russian government is this concept was very important for the West.
This concept violated the agreed position in the OSCE Final Act, adopted in 1975. in Helsinki, because one of the most important decisions of this forum was the confirmation of the legitimacy and territorial integrity of all post-war European states. Having signed the Final Act of Helsinki, Europe recognized the legitimacy, territorial integrity of all post-war states within the borders of Yalta and Potsdam, that is, the fact that the Baltic republics are parts of the Soviet Union. At the same time, only the US signed this most important post-war multilateral document, with the reservation that the US still does not recognize the restoration of the Baltic region as a territory of the USSR. The USA thus pursued the goal of creating a tier of weak and small states between Russia and Germany from the Baltic to the Black Sea under Anglo-Saxon influence. However, to what extent does all this correspond to the norms of international law?
AN Yakovlev - "GM restructuring": it was marked in the Baltic States
The US, and then the total western strategic concept in 1991 year was the restoration of the pre-war Baltic states. Legally, it is justified by the fact that the ruling Supreme Council of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 1940 years to join the Soviet Union have no legal force, as these councils were elected in conditions of "the Soviet occupation".
The application of this concept made it possible to declare Russia an occupant, proceeding from it 40% of the population of the Baltic States (Russians) were deprived of civil and political rights and human rights. Partizan Kononov and today's defendant Savenko are tried according to the laws of today's state for actions that did not qualify as crimes in the state in which these actions were committed. The Russian army and navy were unequivocally concluded. What caused a serious blow to Russia's security and led to enormous material costs. At the same time, which is very important, this territory was legally withdrawn from the single military-strategic space of the Soviet Union, which Russia inherited from treaties in the field of disarmament. It was this concept that served as the legal basis for the dismantling of the radar station in Skrund located there under the 1972 ABM Treaty and the Protocol to it (1974).
Thus, the historical program installation of the West in the twentieth century - to perpetuate the results of the post-revolutionary Brest peace, take irreversible destruction of historical Russia the Bolsheviks, not to recognizerecoverylost territories, declaring its "aggression" of the Bolsheviks. The role of the so-called "AN Yakovlev's commission" (a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) in making this particular an extremely disadvantageous for Russia it is impossible to overestimate the concept.
Let us recall that this man, with his article "Against anti-historicism" published in Pravda in 1972, tried to initiate a real ideological pogrom of "Russian nationalism" and "great-power chauvinism." The future superintendent of perestroika in the spirit of Marx's work The Secret Diplomatic History of the Nineteenth Century and the Bolshevik-Trotskyist reproach of Tsarism attacked the elements of Russian continuity in Soviet state ideology and the national-national line in the leadership of the CPSU. It is interesting that it was A.N. Yakovlev and similar ideologists inside the CPSU were carefully, though implicitly, guardians of the West. What is not surprising, since the orthodox Marxist-Leninist historical materialism and Western European liberalism, are within the framework of the same spiritual and philosophical concept.
Before heading the perestroika and becoming a fiery propagandist of American politics and Western values, A. Yakovlev managed to publish another masterpiece - a book in the spirit that was not even Latebrezhnev's (at that time there was the ideology of detente), but in the spirit of late Khrushchev's blatant propaganda, grin "of US imperialism and" turn around "private property. In spite of this, he was instructed to head the commission to review the Soviet-German treaty 1939, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which can hardly be regarded as an accident. Already too important for the West was the concept, which could be used as a basis for considering the Treaty.
From this or that concept depended on the West and future legal and geopolitical opportunities retraction Baltic military-strategic configuration of NATO, and even the parameters of military-strategic space. Yakovlev, "justified the confidence", and under his leadership the Commission declared the main conceptual basis of their work the idea that the Treaty will be considered by it exclusivelyper se- By itself, without any connection with the events before and after.
All the arguments and the historical facts cited, which introduce other parameters into the discussion, were discarded. Also, any attempts to trace the history and legal foundations of the origin of independence and the territory of the Baltic republics as a result of the civil war, intervention of the Entente and bargaining of the Bolsheviks by territories for the sake of preserving the conquered power in the rest of the country were also severely curtailed. Of course, events in the international arena that immediately preceded the conclusion of the Treaty between the USSR and Germany in August 1939 remained entirely behind the scenes. Truly, the principle of anti-historicism is in action!
The Commission considered the independence of the Baltic states as a result, as the absolute datum, and the Soviet invasion of the Baltics regarded as if it were France or Denmark. The international situation, the Soviet Union's foreign policy efforts with a view to conclude an agreement on collective security with Western powers - all rejected as irrelevant.
Note that the installation of western program of the twentieth century in relation to the USSR fully coincide with Lenin and Trotsky: Russia considered irreversible destruction committed in 1917, as a result of the revolution, and not without the help of the West. But if we recognize that Russia, which has spread to half the world, existed in reality to 1917 years, it is necessary to recognize the fact that the decision "undemocratic" the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic 1940 years of reunification with the "occupier" - the USSR completely legitimate.
It is obvious that the thesis of the "undemocratic" election of the Supreme Council of the Baltic 1940 years belongs to those who can neither be proved nor disproved, although neither the lawyer failed to find the characteristics of the occupation regime in these republics. But the soothing background for the "Legitimist" research in this case is an interpretation of "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact," in which "two totalitarian predator" shared legal and full-fledged independent state.
Applying the same standard that the Baltic politicians suggested (with the submission of their patrons) for the events of the year 1940, it can be concluded with much greater certainty that in 1920 when signing the Treaties of Soviet Russia with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, no legitimate, legitimate separation of the Baltic states from The Russian Empire was not there. Ulmanis, the dictator of the fascist type, who did not choose at all, came to power on German bayonets in the conditions of the German occupation of this part of the Russian Empire. The same applies to Lithuania and Estonia. The legal side of acquiring and recognizing independence consists of absurd inconsistencies.
If the entire concept of today's Baltic independence is based on the recognition of the Soviet-German treaty as invalid from the outset, then there must be a new territorial disengagement, because Lithuania received today's territory only as a result of the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" - the Treaty of 23 Aug. 1939 year, guaranteeing non-interference of Germany, if the USSR undertakes restoration of lost territories during the revolution and civil war. Moreover, it was in that "shameful" secret protocol that "the interests of Lithuania in the Vilna region are recognized by both sides." The facts from the archives testify not to the shame of this Treaty, but to the fact that, having received Vilna in the subsequent Treaty of Lithuania with the USSR from 10 Oct., 1939 soon after this protocol, Lithuania was exulting, people took to the streets with national flags and hugged! If Lithuania is a pre-war state and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is "criminal", dethroned and recognized as non-existent, then the territory of Lithuania should be revised.
With anyone else worked Allies - with White or Red?
In the light of this understanding, the topic of the so-called Entente intervention in Russia looks completely different, the aim of which was not at all to crush Bolshevism and the communist ideology, and not to help the White Movement restore the former united Russia. Soviet historiography focused on the class and ideological impulses of the Western powers. But these motivations were always geopolitical and military-strategic, which explains the alternate cooperation or partnership with the Red Army against the White, then on the contrary, it ended as a whole with the betrayal of the Entente by the White Army. The Entente policy was an example of ignobility towards its Russian ally, and reflected the rapacious attitude toward it, exactly repeated in 1991.
It is necessary to pay special attention to the fact that it was the Entente itself that decided on the abandonment of German troops in the Baltic States after the surrender of Germany. France, saved only by Russia and its victims on the Eastern Front, included in the text of the Compiègne Armistice 1918 a paragraph on the preservation of the troops of Kaiser Germany in the Baltics, with their simultaneous withdrawal from all other occupied territories. German troops were withdrawn from there only after they were replaced by the British in order to maintain and consolidate the independence of the Baltic states and ensure the separation of these territories from the revolution-ridden Russia.
In 1918, before the capitulation of Germany, the Entente countries landed their landing parties in Russia solely in the hope of restoring the eastern German front, and preventing the Germans from taking advantage of the military-strategic advantages bestowed on them by the Bolsheviks in the Brest World. It is now clear that this very "bawdy" (Lenin) Treaty allowed the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian quasi-state structures to take shape on the German bayonets and became the fundamental principle of the processes in the Baltic region that led to the formation of the anti-Russian Baltic link in the 90-XX years.
Documents and white emigre archives convince that none of the promises of assistance from the Entente given to the representatives of various anti-Bolshevik formations were not met even at the first stage, when the Red Army was still poorly organized, and the outcome of the struggle was not predetermined. But this was not at all part of the plans of Britain and the United States. In the Baltic States, the British appeared in December 1918, immediately after the departure of Germans from there, but not to restore the unnecessary Eastern Front, but to form a sanitary cordon controlled from them, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, for which independent Baltic governments were needed .
In August 1919, the British emissary to a predefined list of appointed North-Western government under General Yudenich, and writes M.Margulies, personally participated in the drafting of the government required all members to sign the sheet, which means "the recognition of the independence of Estonia" otherwise the Entente would cease assistance. "But help was not followed, even in the days of the offensive Yudenich and independent Estonian government, in response to a request for a response," it would be unforgivable stupidity on the part of the Estonian people, if he did it. "
The Entente did not recognize any of the White emigre governments of Russia, which, unlike the Bolsheviks, categorically refused to trade the territories. However, as A.Denikin writes bitterly in his book "World Events and the Russian Question," at the same time they "willingly and hurriedly recognized all the new states that emerged on the outskirts of Russia." This is confirmed not only by the white emigre books, but also by the notes of G. Mikhailovsky, a member of the Russian foreign ministry, who later served under the Provisional Government and under Denikin and Wrangel, found in the manuscript ten years ago. They were made directly during the events and were not processed on the basis of later generalizations, remaining a fount of information about the situation surrounding the implementation of the foreign policy objectives of the White Movement. "Complications with the British," according to his testimony, "occurred on the basis of the undoubted duplicity of their policies. If with one hand they supported Denikin in the south of Russia, and in Kolchak in Siberia, and the other - the clear enemies of Denikin and Russia in general ... on the shores of the Baltic Sea, our Baltic outskirts found powerful support in Britain for their separatist aspirations ... This general tone, The policy of expressis verbis was defined by Lloyd George himself in the English parliament when he bluntly said that he doubted the benefits to England of restoring the former powerful Russia. "
The last Russian foreign minister, Sazonov, who was based in Paris, had information delivered through the former Russian embassy in London concerning "the grandiose plan of England aimed at dismembering Russia." The Baltic states were to finally cut Russia off from the Baltic Sea, the Caucasus should be a buffer entirely independent of Russia, between it, on the one hand, and Turkey and Persia - on the other, Turkestan had to become as independent as it was, so that once and for all, The Persia fell entirely under British rule, and the "independence" of the Caucasus, Turkestan and the Baltic states would be limited to Britain's practical protectorate over these areas. "(GN Mikhailovsky. From the history of the Russian Foreign Ministry. 1914-1920. M., 1993, 2 book. Page. 209-210.)
The Bolsheviks, vitally interested "in a peaceful respite" proved to be more beneficial for the partners of the Entente and the self-proclaimed government in the territory of historical Russia than White.
In the Foreign Policy Archive of the USSR there is a letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G.V. Chicherin, who very eloquently demonstrates the utilitarian attitude of the Bolsheviks to the "democratic" principles declared by them, as well as cynical bargaining by the territories to achieve their goals: "Self-determination is a principle applicable in general and not in separate geographical points," - Chicherin, "In all our treaties, not only in Brest, but also in all our last treaties, we violated this principle in relation to individual localities." We gave Estonia a purely Russian slice, we gave Finland Pecheng y, where the population did not want to do so, we did not ask Latgale for the transfer of her to Latvia, we gave away purely Belarusian areas to Poland. "
Further, there follows a very pragmatic explanation of the expediency of using this principle as an ordinary tool of the Realpolitik: "This is all due to the fact that under the present general situation, in the struggle of the Soviet Republic with the capitalist encirclement, the supreme principle is the self-preservation of the Soviet Republic as the citadel of the revolution. the principle has to be based on agreements with bourgeois states in which our principles are not being implemented, and for the same principle, or the geographical points necessary for the very existence of the Soviet Republic, that is, for the supreme principle of its preservation.We are guided not by nationalism, but by the interests of the world revolution. "(WUA USSR, p. 04.op.51, p.N321a, d. 54877, l. 21.)
How "democratic" came the independence of Baltic
The facts from the territorial redistribution of the times of the revolution and civil war demonstrate the legal failure of the concept of the restoration of pre-war states for gaining independence by the Soviet republics in 1991. on the basis of the alleged illegitimacy of the events of 1940. In the 20-s, the Bolshevik Ioffe, who signed treaties with Latvia and Estonia, was represented by a government that did not control the entire territory of the country and was not recognized by anyone in the world. And the contract unquestionably contained secret and oral articles. For Ulmanis was transferred to Latgale - part of the Vitebsk province in exchange for helping the Bolsheviks in the encirclement and liquidation of the white army.
The self-proclaimed government of Estonia, whose independence from the northwestern white government demanded the recognition of the British representative, took the most significant part in the encirclement and disarmament of the army of the white general Yudenich, who was denied assistance shortly before. At the request of Trotsky, the Estonian authorities, who were with him in the most cordial accord, "bourgeois-landowner", interned and planted white compounds for barbed wire, where thousands of people died. For this, Estonians received from the Bolsheviks about 1000 square. km of Russian lands on a peace treaty from 2 February 1920. Now Estonia is claiming these lands.
The Lithuanian state arose in spite of the intentions of Britain and France, and they did not hurry to recognize Lithuania, hoping to create a "strong anti-Soviet Poland" near the borders of Soviet Russia, into which Lithuania would also be federally incorporated. The Lithuanian representation, which proclaimed independence back in December of the year 1917, first set out to establish "eternal strong allied ties with Germany." But in Lithuania there was a dual power. The October Revolution, the November revolution in Germany, the defeat of Germany at the end of the war were the background on which another Soviet government was proclaimed in Vilna, which declared its solidarity with Soviet Russia, and even then decided to join one republic with Belarus.
But when the Vilna councils fell under the blows of Pilsudski, and only the government remained in Kovno, the Entente unequivocally took sides with Poland in its dispute with Lithuania over the Vilna territory. Only Soviet Russia consistently in the Treaty with Lithuania and in all foreign policy documents repeated that it regards the Vilnius region as a Lithuanian territory illegally torn away by Poland. But the idea of a Western outpost in the form of a "strong" or "mighty" Poland, as was repeated in the British plan for the post-war arrangement in 1944, is a permanent goal, primarily for the Anglo-Saxons, but for Europe as a whole, as we can now see.
According to modern criteria of the "democratic" legitimacy of power, it was the Vilna Council, which proclaimed Soviet power, then united with the Byelorussian Soviet Republic and eventually fell under the blows of Polish troops Y. Pilsudski, had some semblance of legitimacy, since 8 December 1918 arose, in the presence of German troops, but after the surrender of Germany, when these troops were no longer occupying power and were awaiting withdrawal. And the so-called Lithuanian tariff in Kovno, which proclaimed the "restoration" of independence and "eternal strong allied ties" with Germany, was put in December by the Kaiser occupation authorities and did not have any legitimacy from the point of view of state law, both that and today . However, it is with this structure that Lithuania today counts its independence.
In the spring of 1919, the Polish legions of J. Pilsudski and 21 April 1919g immediately invaded Lithuania with the consent of the Entente. captured Vilna. The Polish occupation was subjected to precisely the part that was guided by Russia, and it was more convenient for Pilsudski that it was - "Soviet", then still not recognized by the powers and a draw. After some time, when with the help of Wrangel, who struck the Bolsheviks in the rear, Yu. Pilsudsky stopped Budyonny, he replied that he did not see any sense in helping turn Wrangel. "Let Russia still rot down 50 years under the Bolsheviks, and we will get on our feet and get stronger!". Those were his words.
The facts cited from the territorial redistribution of the times of the revolution and the civil war demonstrate the legal inconsistency of the concept of the restoration of the pre-war states, and even with the very strange departure of Lithuania from the territory received after the Treaty 10 October. 1939. and finally fixed as Lithuanian only in the USSR. The interwar status of the Baltic states is legally defective, and the events of the year 1940, however disagreeable their form seemed (the entry of Soviet troops) is a law-restoring act, for there was no legitimate separation from the Russian Empire, but a temporary loss of territory as a result of the civil war and revolution .
The obvious failure of "democratic" Kozyrev's foreign policy in this important region, threatens Russia uncompensated loss of access to the sea in the Baltic Sea and the transformation of the region into a zone of US strategic initiatives and NATO, of course, plan to make these republics members of the North Atlantic Alliance. The flagrant violation of the rights of Russian, as well as the humiliation of Russian troops with indifference and even the promotion of European human rights organizations clearly demonstrates a double standard with regard to European Russia.
But no sporadic sharp statements of the Russian leadership are unable to radically change the situation, as long as the concept of "separation" of the Baltic republics imposed by the Popular Front, supported by Europe and meekly accepted by Russian diplomacy will not be revised in accordance with international law.
A bit of history, which is useful for the future
The Soviet Union and today's Russia - the successor of historical Russia have indisputable rights to this territory arising from international legal conditions of their entry into Russia.
The Northern War between Russia Peter the Great and the Kingdom of Sweden ended in the defeat of Charles XII and the signing of the Nishtat Treaty 1721. At that time Latvians and Estonians were not subjects of history, but were citizens of the "Crown of Sveisk". They, not only never had their own statehood, but did not yet have a literary language, their own national elite, because the entire local nobility was of German origin, and also the teaching in educational institutions was conducted in German. Only under Alexander II there were educational institutions with instruction in the Latvian language. At that time, the replacement of geographical indications by the Russian present denouncers of "prisons of peoples" is called Russification, forgetting that the former signposts were in German ...
Nishtatsky peace treaty of 1721part of the body of international legal instruments, on which the legitimacy of the territory of many countries of the world. The current boundaries of the United States, Sweden, France or Spain and are based, among others, a very ancient international legal instruments, and no one today is not disputed. Under this agreement,Russia received these territories forevernot just as a winner in the Northern War,but due to their purchase."His Majesty is pledged to pay the Kingdom of Sweden for five years," two million yefimki properly without any deduction and of course by HRH with proper and authorized receipts snabdennym authorized ... "(Under the banner of Russia. Collection of archival documents. M., 1992, s.122)- By the standards of a considerable amount of silver through the Bank of Amsterdam, which had already carried out the global financial "monitoring". This amount can be compared with the prices of the treasury of a small state.
It is obvious that Russia's position may not change significantly against the Baltic states without changing the concept. If from the very beginning was the basis and carried to all the clear understanding that Russia will not have to deal with pre-war states, and with parts of the Soviet Union, that is, with the former Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, wish to become independent states, many things would be different today, especially in the military-strategic area,
as well as in the field of human rights for Russian in semifascist modes of these new "superdemokraticheskih" countries. The West, especially the United States, of course, do not wish to overcome the double standards brazenly applied to the problems of the former USSR. But without such a conceptual review of the strategy can hardly be expected capacity to effectively protect the interests of Russia and the Baltic states to prevent the entry into the North Atlantic structures that Russia will return to the position before the Livonian War.
It would be useful to start this difficult and not promising quick results, but necessary work. If Europe does not want to be held hostage to the Anglo-Saxon Atlantic globalist ventures, it must realize that serious and constructive cooperation with Russia for the stability and predictability of European processes themselves must be the recognition of the historical continuity of Russia's geopolitical interests in the traditional habitat of its influence.