It's hard to name in modern America other equally striking figures of politicians and ideologues of foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, associated with Republicans, and Zbignev Bzhezinsky, who worked in the administration under the Democrats. Their mark in the US policy of the past decades is noticeable, and intellectual longevity envy younger colleagues. It is especially interesting, given their vast experience, pay attention to their assessment of the current state of US-Russian relations.
As for the Polish (by birth) Brzezinski, his implacable gaze on Russia has not changed, but Brzezinski well aware that the changing balance of power in the world. And America, rather, should seek common ground with Moscow than to continue the endless enmity. Kissinger speaks in the same spirit, but even more definitely. Recently added to this fear that the chances offered by history, may be missed. Both are veteran America, only makes it more judiciously than many of their younger colleagues, to hold public office.
So, at the very moment of the February (2014) coup in Kiev, Brzezinski said that Washington should have promised Moscow to get from the "genuinely independent and territorially complete Ukraine" a neutral course similar to that pursued by Finland (article Russia needs a 'Finland option 'for Ukraine in the Financial Times 23 February 2014 year). According to Brzezinski, such a model could mean "a mutually respectful neighborhood, a wide range of economic relations [of Ukraine] with Russia and the EU; Non-alignment with any military alliances that Moscow considers directed against it. " This quite pragmatic consideration did not, of course, save Brzezinski from his old phobias, and in June of the same year 2014, speaking at the conference "Mutual security in question? Russia, the West and the architecture of European security "at the Wilson Center in Washington, he called for confrontation with" quasi-mystical Russian chauvinism. " Nevertheless, the line he proposed was "to discuss with the Russians the formula of the final compromise." In this formula, as Brzezinski sees it, the process of Kiev's rapprochement with the European Union must be long, "by the type of Turkey," so as not to create special problems for Russia. The US, according to the former adviser to President Carter on national security, should convince Russia that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO; that Ukraine will not also be a member of the EU, but it can conclude a separate trade agreement with Russia, taking into account that "some forms of exchange and trade between them are mutually beneficial."
Kissinger sees further. The West must understand, he says, that "for Russia, Ukraine will never simply be one of the foreign countries" (in the West, indeed, this basic circumstance is poorly understood). At the same time, Kissinger does not want the United States, so to speak, to succumb to Ukraine to Moscow: a compromise, it seems to him, should consist in the fact that Ukraine will become a "bridge between East and West, and not an outpost of one of these opponents in opposing the other" . And Kissinger quite soberly notes: "Any attempt of one" wing "of Ukraine to dominate over the other will eventually result in a civil war or the collapse of the country."
Recipe "final solution" of the Ukrainian issue, according to Kissinger, coincides with what Brzezinski offers: Ukraine should be able to develop relations with Europe and Russia, but NATO will not enter. "To cooperate with the West, but not to quarrel with Russia."
Many experts believe that Kissinger plays a significant role in the dialogue between Moscow and Washington, having a good personal relationship with D. Trump, and with Putin. Perhaps, these experts do not make mistakes. According to the correspondent of the Italian La Stampa in New York Paolo Mastrolilli, Kissinger would be happy to enter into the history of man, "to prevent a new Cold War."
In late March of this year, Genri Kissindzher spoke in Washington at the annual meeting of the Trilateral Commission (sometimes perceive it as the "world shadow government") and said that there is a profound lack of understanding of Russia in the world. "Putin is not Hitler's double, he does not intend to pursue a policy of conquest. Its aim is to restore the dignity of the country, from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, in the form in which it has always been ... to depict Putin global supervillain - this is a bug in the long term, and on the merits. "
An alternative to dialogue with Russia, Kissinger believes, would be the emergence of a disastrous confrontation for all. True, he offers a "bargain" in this case in an original way: insisting on the "neutrality" of Ukraine, Kissinger admits that "the fate of the Crimea can be a subject of discussion," but after that, he says, Moscow "must make it very clear that Russia does not has the right to remain in the Middle East. " It's easy to recognize the corporate American style - to get something tangible, promising "in exchange" something that you have never had and no. However, the course of the thought itself is noteworthy, and experts in the art of diplomacy will note this.
After the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House, Zbigniew Brzezinski did not join those who condemned the mood for improving relations with Russia that flashed from the new president. In an interview with his daughter Mike Brzezinski said that "on the whole it is very desirable": they say, Russia is no longer a communist state. "However," he remarked, "there is still uncertainty. And a lot of resentment, including us [Americans]. " Russia, Brzezinski assures, is at the stage of transition, so if America behaves cleverly, it may help Russia "make this transition and become a constructive, important member of the world community." Such speeches were heard from America and in the 90-ies, but it is interesting that Brzezinski not only repeats himself: for example, he clearly supported the possibility of establishing good personal relations between Trump and Putin. Moreover, quite unexpectedly, Brzezinski expressed the idea of forming a kind of "triumvirate" - a broad international coalition for solving global problems, the leading role in which "America, China - and changing Russia could play!".
On the "triple format" reflects and Kissinger. This was to guess the main point on which the two luminary of American foreign policy thinking, talking about normalization of relations with Russia, coincided: the fear of close Sino-Russian rapprochement, which would make the new alignment of forces in the world unprofitable for America. "The triple partnership" is seen (not just two veterans) way to avoid such a scenario. However, this topic deserves special consideration.
In general, the views of Brzezinski and Kissinger on major international problems often diverge. And when their approach somewhat the same, it's a symptom. Or, if you prefer, a diagnosis. Do listen to the diagnosis "patients"?