The Syrian army is conducting such a successful offensive in several directions at once, that attempts to at least slow down the progress of the SAA are unlikely to be long in coming. Apparently, the formal reason is the return of control over the border with Jordan. But the subtlety is that Iran will be the main "bad guy".
As of the beginning of summer, Syrian government troops confidently retain the initiative in virtually all areas where military operations are being conducted and, owing to the guilt of militants, the de-escalation regime is not respected. At the same time, Russian VCs are used point-by-point, mainly along the columns of jihadists, moving to the landmark sectors of the front from the rear, mainly from Rakki, the "capital" of IGIL *.
So, for two days the Russian military aviation successfully stopped attempts by IGIL to transfer to the Palmyra a very significant reserve by local standards. At the same time terrorists acted ingeniously. As soon as it was dark, three columns emerged from Rakka along the divergent rays to the southern direction. VCS destroyed all three in a row, starting with the largest. In it, up to 120 militants were eliminated, in the next two - 80, along with armored vehicles, trucks and "jihad-mobiles" with mortars.
At the same time, there were eight tankers in the columns, which in itself indicates that in the area of Rakki, IGIL still retains the opportunity to extract and process oil.
In parallel, at a number of the so-called new sectors of the front, that is, those formed during the expansion of the offensive by the government forces after the liberation of Aleppo, the SAA and the Allies partially shifted to the tactics of deep ambushes. For example, the other day in the province of Deraa in the south of the country, an unidentified spetsnaz destroyed a convoy of militants, and then reinforcements of the enemy arrived there. It was on the road from Kafr Shams to the village of Akraba in the countryside. It is possible that these are parts of the special purpose of the 4 Armored Division, which was recently transferred to the Syrian-Jordanian border in this province.
Now this section of the "new" front has become the most mobile. Government forces are rapidly moving through the desert along the state border, leaving in the rear the city of Kalamun, more precisely, cutting it off from the border. Previously, it was assumed that the intermediate goal of the offensive in the south could be the city of At-Tanf, but so far, the SAA does not aspire to it.
On the other hand, government troops began to suddenly boldly enter the desert and advance along it, not "tied" to the highways. Previously, the desert was the "access zone" of mostly militants, and the Syrian army for years suffered from cutting the supply routes along the few key routes it was too easy.
To the east of Palmyra, militants continue to exert fierce resistance and even try to counterattack. Despite this, government forces expand the control zone, but they have to constantly monitor the open flanks. The pressure on the Igilovites is mainly north of the Palmyra-Thais route in order to force them into the desert - as far as possible from the supply routes - and relieve tension from the most stretched northern flank of the government grouping near Palmyra.
On the southern flank, there is no such obvious threat due to the terrain that is unprofitable for a counter-offensive.
To the east of Aleppo, government forces concentrated so large forces under the command of General Suheil al-Hassan that they were able to literally roll out militant positions and reach the outskirts of the city of Mascagna, the last "fortress" of jihadists in the province of Aleppo.
Elite "Tigers" have already entered the southwestern suburbs of Maskana, and the grouping of troops as a whole took under fire control the route Maskana - Tabka - Rakka - the only way of retreat for the militants.
Meanwhile, it is quite possible that most of the jihadist garrison of Maskana has already left the city, leaving only a rear of suicide bombers to slow the progress of government troops.
At the same time, there is another danger that foreign policy factors can, if not stop the successful actions of government forces and their allies in a number of areas, then at least greatly slow their pace to "clarify the circumstances."
For example, the pro-American coalition in Iraq is dissatisfied with the fact that a significant part of the Syrian-Iraqi border was taken last week not by government forces of Damascus, but by Shiite allied forces. In Baghdad, they see this as an insidious plan of Iran, which is allegedly going to organize a military corridor from its territory through Iraq to Syria and thereby achieve more favorable starting conditions for the next round of peace talks in Astana, at least in Geneva.
These are the usual geopolitical fears that the region of the Near and Middle East is full of. Approximately the same claims in Ankara are periodically presented to different Kurdish groupings. Such kind of informational outliers are characteristic for local thinking - and can have a serious impact on the European view of what is happening and provoke intervention.
In reality, plans to transfer Iran's troops through two states with an unclear purpose are meaningless and impossible. But the restoration of control of Damascus over a significant part of the state borders of Syria is possible, and is conceivable, and really serious.